Much ofzvlmt ziv call "taste" lies in this, the conformity between discriminations demanded by a painting and the skills of discrimination possessed by the beholder.
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Aberlhaw Construction Company, Catalog, 1926 The significance of technological expertise in the creation and reception of modern building styles resides in the influence of non-architects on building trends; namely, the processes by which scientific experts and producers of materials create reputations for their services. The successes of these practitioners stand in high relief for historians in the thousands of utilitarian buildings added to the North American landscape since 1900, designed not by architects but by engineering and building firms employing new building procedures and products. These factory buildings. power houses, warehouses, and railroad signal towers did not emerge uninfluenced by contemporary trends in academic architecture, but their primary origins are in their designers' impulses toward standardization and mass production.
Their history offers a site in which to probe the relationship of functionalist building forms to contemporary technological, professional, and market practices.
To begin this project, we can borrow Michael Baxandall's directive for regarding painting, in which he recommends a method of aligning the production history of visual objects with their public reception.
It is not a complete analytic instmment, as I will explain, but it does have some very useful suggestions for imbuing objects To test the usefulness of this historical approach, we can consider the development of the reinforced-concrete factory building in America between 1900 and 1930. These were structures of tremendous uniformity. Almost universally without ornament or cladding, they bared their standardized reinforced-concrete frames to the world.
Most had large expanses of mass-produced steel-sash windows between their concrete beams and columns. The fifteenth-century painters possessed a multi-sided expertise that included technical knowledge and an understanding of how that technical knowledge appeared to patrons. In a parallel way, experts in the behavior and use of reinforced concrete after 1900 created a reliable and sophisticated artifact-the concrete-frame factory buildingthat publicized the skills of its creators. The exposed-concrete frame was both the literal trace of scientific knowledge and an advertisement of that knowledge. The commercial success of the reinforcedconcrete factory building came through experts' interweaving of technical problemsolving with strategic maneuvering in the competitive market systems.
The emergence of the reinforced-concrete factory building began with the transformation of concrete from an expensive and unpredictable commodity into one that fit the practical and economic conditions of early twentieth-century construction. Materials experts were central figures in this effort, performing
at Scnnton. Penn»ylvanij Aberthaw Construction Company, Catalog, 1926 pedagogical and scientific tasks with the commercial market for concrete in mind.
Materials scientists and engineers established university departments for concrete research, taught succeeding generations of experts in the discipline, and adapted their knowledge for application in the daily routines of concrete construction.
Working within the university engineering schools eager to give their students practical preparation for commercial employment, As consultants to industry, the materials experts claimed the same balance in their own talents, but further articulated their special standing in the commercial sector.
They chose to charge for some of their services but not others, and to publicize some findings but not others. They recommendations for safe, reliable cement products and concrete construction. These recommendations were adopted by other organizations and by many American cities in official building codes. In these specifications, methods of field testing received far greater emphasis than did specific performance criteria for concrete.
Their authors believed the manner in which a test was conducted, and the expertise of the person by whom it was conducted, to be better guarantees of the quality of a cement or concrete than the achievement of specific test results.
Here, again, applications of science were associated not just with particular practices but with particular practitioners. Such applications of scientific knowledge held a compound appeal for firms that built factories in the early twentieth century. They signaled economy and reliability but also facilitated the implementation of hierarchies of skill and opportunity that were rapidly becoming entrenched in American construction as Taylorist tenets of systematic management gained a following. In many productive industries of 1900, labor was being minutely divided and conceptual tasks removed from the "shop floor" to managerial spheres. Firms that specialized in building reinforcedconcrete factories followed this trend, and found the occupational distinctions promoted by concrete experts to fit tidily within their socioeconomic programs.
These firms offered an integrated set of services that included plant siting, design, and erection. Their operators claimed a broad knowledge base and experience in these areas, associating the reinforcedconcrete factory building with technical and managerial expertise that was both specialized and comprehensive. By contrast, on the construction site itself, the firms implemented the rationalization procedures of large-scale industrial production. The physical work of concrete construction was relegated by firm managers to a stratum of workers believed to have little expertise, or little need for it.
The separation of the two types of work was strictly maintained. This branch of the building industry mechanized many of the materials handling and assembly tasks that For turn-of-the-century materials experts, the creation of a commercial jurisdiction following from the implementation of these work practices in addition to the concrete specialists' activities, have to be seen as at once programmatic and opportunistic.'' The success of scientifically monitored reinforced-concrete buildings conferred a prestige on the engineers, and once made, reputations were used to bring further opportunities. ' This control of opportunities within an occupational arena represents a particular social inequity-a consequence of the use of standardized building forms that is not explored in most accounts of twentieth-century architecture, even those that address the processes of commodification in the arts. believing "representation to be a disinterested and therefore politically neutral activity," and poststmcturalist critique deeming representation to be "an inextricaole part of social processes of domination and control." 5. This is along the lines of injunctions offered by Roger Chartier for the anthropological analysis of actions described in historic texts.
In discussing ways to "decipher the symbolic system that underlies a text," Chartier warns that one must "define the instances of behavior and the rituals present in the text on the basis of remote resemblances to codified forms among the repertory of Western folkculture. Roger Chartier, "Text, Symbol and Frenchness: Historical Uses of Symbolic Anthropology," journal of Modern History, 1985;  reprinted in Cultural History: Betireen Practice and Representation. Lydia G. Cochrane, trans. 
